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CHECK HANDLING UNDER ARTICLE
FOUR OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
FAIRFAX LEARY, JR.*
In any system of jurisprudence based on precedent, it is too easy for
the law to get out of harmony with the practices of business. It is also
true that judges under our system face two tasks in every case. The
first and primary task is to resolve in a fair and decent fashion the
dispute between the parties before the Court. The second task is to fit
the decision into the pattern of the law as it appears to be evolving
from the cases and statutes available to the judge. Often the two tasks
appear to conflict. While it is difficult to articulate, most people have an
innate sense of fairness against which they evaluate the choices, or
decisions, that they must make. Judges are people and have, inevitably,
the same sense of fairness and decency.
On analysis, however, the sense of fairness and decency reacts to
the facts' of a given situation only as those facts are presented and
understood. In an adversary legal system, the facts of the situation
come from only two sources: those presented by the litigants, and those
known to the decision makers2 from prior experience, or ascertained
by independent research.
When the decision is made in a given case, its place in the facade
of the law will largely depend upon community reaction, 3 and this in
turn is derived from what the decision says it is deciding and the
knowledge and experience of the community.
In the case of the decision itself, and in the case of the community's
evaluation thereof, there is often a considerable difference between the
actual decision, based on the totality of all the facts, those stated and
urged upon the decision makers, and those felt or unconsciously as-
sumed, and the effect of the decision as precedent, based on the quality
of the written opinion and the subsequent evaluation of it as used in
other judicial decision making.
*A.B. Princeton, 1932; L.L.B. Harvard, 1935; Formerly Reporter for Article
4 Uniform Commercial Code; Member of the District of Columbia, New
York and Philadelphia, Pa. Bars.
The Final Draft of Article 4 was not prepared by the author.
1 The word is here used in a broad sense to include prior concepts as to the
applicable rules of law, and general understandings as to the way business
is conducted, whether or not made a part of the record.
2 "Decision makers" include both judge and, where used, jury, in the exercise
of their specific functions.
3 The word "community" is used in the limited sense of the lawyers, judges
and others concerned with the effect of the particular case. In the civil rights
area the community is, of course, very large. In commercial matters, the
community is very small.
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In the field of commercial law, the inability to present and have full
consideration given to a complete picture of the effect of alternate
resolutions of a given dispute upon the course of business as a whole,
has resulted in much bad law, as the judicial sense of fairness and
decency has evolved decisions with respect to the particular cases to
be decided, without too great an appreciation of the possible effect of
the enunciated ruling on the course of business as a whole.
The trouble is inherent in our system of jurisprudence. Commercial
cases often involve small amounts of money. The businessman is inter-
ested primarily in his particular situation, usually his only question on
one side is whether he does or does not have to pay, and on the other
how much money will he get. Lawyers' fees are to be kept within a
reasonable relationship to the sums involved. Hence, except where true
professional zeal is involved, the lawyer keeps his hours spent on the
case in some sort of relation to the fee, and the judge does not have
the benefit of exhaustive briefs or an unhurried trial.
All of the foregoing presses toward a statutory treatment of com-
mercial subjects, and in particular in the field of bank collections, where
a Code treatment with Official Comments affords a unique opportunity
to present the decision makers with background material and to show
the interplay of the various over-all factors that should affect a decision
that is to have precedental value.
What then are the policy considerations that should bear upon the
decision-making process in the field of the collection of checks through
banking channels? A businessman, the author believes, now regards a
check not as a credit device, but as a "payment" device. It is the medium
we have worked out for paying for goods and services in the vast and
an ever increasing majority of cases.4 The function of a check is to
effect the transfer of "immediately available" funds from the Buyer's
account in his bank to the Seller's account in his bank in the sales
transaction. The function is the same in a myriad of other transactions,
including payment of salaries, repayment of loans, payment of taxes or
any other transaction calling for a payment from A to B.
Here we face the first of the situations in which the law has, perhaps,
not kept pace with business practice, and yet perhaps it has. No rule
of law compels a businessman to accept a check or to deal through the
banking system at all. No rule of law compels the holder of a check
4The increasing use of the check is probably more concentrated in urban and
industrial areas. Many corporations now use checks to pay all employees, in-
cluding weekly wage earners. "Special" checking accounts and other "ten
cents a check" plans make checks available to the many who cannot afford
to maintain minimum balances. All of this is not to deny a tremendous volume
of "cash" transactions. Even in the "cash and carry" supermarkets, however,
managers are cashing checks in substantial volume to enable the housewife
to pay at the "check-out" counter.
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to deposit it in his own bank account, or even to have a bank account.'
Yet no bank today could remain open if every check or item presented
to it on that day was required to be paid over-the-counter in cash. The
bankers just do not keep sums of that magnitude available in currency.
The banking community is oriented to operating largely on the prin-
ciple of the set-off of mutual claims.
Ideally, if all transactions were local ones, and there was only one
bank in the community, each person having an account would give the
bank a list of the transfers to be made from his or her account to the
accounts of other customers, and "payment" would be effected when
the bank posted the transfers to the indicated accounts. Even if there
were two or more banks, if everyone knew the bank of deposit of each
person to whom a payment had to be made, the list method could be
used, but, in general, these facts are not known.
Custom and the absence of necessary knowledge have, however,
decreed the use of the customary oblong pieces of paper as the mechani-
cal means of effecting the necessary transfers. And these are used in
truly astonishing numbers. 6 In addition, studies have shown that checks
issued in recent years have almost unanimously been good. The area
of risk appears to be about one eighth of one per cent.7 From these
facts we can deduce two principles that have guided the selection of
the statutory rules governing a law of check collections. One is that
5 Many payroll checks are cashed at local markets or at a bar-and-grill by the
weekly wage employees who perhaps only bank "savings." However, prac-
tically no businesses today operate without a bank account.
6 In 1963 the Federal Reserve System handled 4,700,000,000 items for collection,
the Fed. of Chicago alone handled 700,000,000. But these are "inter-city"
items, and the local clearing house items must be added. Conservative esti-
mates by knowledgeable bankers place the total, country wide at 50,000,000
a day, and 13,000,000,000 a year. One study made some years ago by the author
showed that banks with deposits of $5,000,000 or less averaged from 1,000 to
3,000 items a day. The figures relate to items, not to "handlings," which will
vary from bank to bank, and, on an average, the figures should probably be
multiplied by 7 to equal total "handlings" by all banks concerned. For a
description of the mechanics of check handling in 1949 see Leary, Deferred
Posting and Delayed Returns-The Current Check Collection Problem, 62
HARv. L. REv. 905 (1949).
7 Studies made by the Federal Reserve Banks yield a figure of about 9932%
by number and 99Y4 by dollar value for those paid in due course. A further
examination of the initially dishonored items indicate that about half of these
are paid upon a re-presentment. These statistics are the basis for two pro-
visions in the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter called the "Code").
One, in Section 3-507, refers to a "term in a draft or an endorsement thereof
allowing a stated time for re-presentment" in the case of certain dishonors,
which in the case of a check would be dishonor by non payment. The second
is in Section 4-108 permitting extensions of time by a collecting bank for
"specific items" of up to an additional "banking day" in a good faith effort
to secure payment. This last must be done on an item-by-item basis, and banks
should note that while the "midnight deadline" [UNIFORM Coi aERClAL CODE
4-104 (h)] is the usual cut off hour, the extension is only to the close of a
"banking day" [UNIFORM CO mEcIAL CODE §4-104 (c)] which ends when
the bank closes its doors "to the public for the carrying of substantially all
of its banking functions." Thus evening hours, when the bank is open for
the receipt of deposits and cashing of checks, will not be a part of the "bank-
ing day."
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the rules must be suitable for a bulk processing of large numbers of
checks at little cost. The second, which is a corrollary of the first, is
that rules to ensure a proper allocation of losses incurred in the area
of the one eighth of one percent of bad items should not be so re-
strictive as to clog the free flow and smooth handling of the almost
unanimous number of good checks, collections in bulk, and deferred
posting.
With regard to checks, the point to be made is that banks do not
collect a check. They collect bulk loads of checks. The process is not
an individualized one, it has become a highly mechanized, fast moving
procedure currently moving rapidly into an electronically computerized
operation where checks are sorted and proved at utterly fantastic
speeds." And still the ever increasing volume moves ahead of the facili-
ties provided for its handling. Thus, the third principle can be distilled;
the collection rules should foster speed in the transfer of bank credits,
but only to the extent consistent with efficient operation of a bulk
processing system.
The rash of so-called "deferred posting" statutes in the post World
War II period emphasized the application of these principles.9 The
adjective "so-called" is properly applied because' the statutes nowhere
use the term "deferred-posting," but by extending the time within
which a bank may return an item as not properly payable, the statutes
gave the banks sufficient time in which to provide for the orderly proc-
essing of the demand items10 (primarily checks) referred to in the
statutes. Statutory treatment of the problem was necessary because two
common-law rules had over-emphasized speedy action. The first was the
rule that entry of credit in a depositor's passbook constituted a "final
payment" of all depostited items drawn on the bank.1" The second was
the so-called "next day" rule whereby it was considered negligence if
s In banks using electronic systems, the "fine sorting" machines sort at the rate
of 1,600 items a minute or 96,000 items an hour! A "bookkeeping" section
(usually two girls as a team) handles 4,500 regular checking accounts or
10,000 "special checking" accounts. The work load of a substantial Phila-
delphia bank is about 800,000 items a day. The number of accounts handled
by a particular team will vary with the activity of the accounts, of course.
'Management has given the author the above figures as averages. Each check
is visually inspected at the "sections" for date, correspondence of amount
between "words" and "figures" and signature. The average daily work load
of a section is in the neighborhood of 7,500 items for about seven hours of
actual working time, which includes balancing with the clearings, checking
for stop orders and other legals, overdrafts, and drawing against uncollected
funds.
9 The statutes up to 1949 are collected in the Article cited supra n. 6 at p.
924-928.
10 Article 4 uses the term "item" [UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-104 (g)] to
include any instrument, whether or not negotiable, calling for the payment of
money. The term does not include money itself. Bankers divide collections
into "cash items" and "non cash items," the latter usually covering items
requiring some special handling that excludes them from the bulk channel.
The excluded items are not the same in all sections of the country.See, e.g., Kirkham v. Bank of America, 165 N.Y. 132, 58 N.E. 753 (1900).
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any person receiving a check drawn and payable in the "same town"
did not present it for payment on the next banking day, or if payable
in a "different town" did not start it on its way through collection chan-
nels by the next banking day.12 When these concepts were coupled with
the rule that a payor bank's retention of an item payable by it beyond
24 hours rendered the bank liable on the item,13 and that dishonor in
such case related back to the day of presentment, trouble was bound to
follow as volume increased.
One solution adopted by the Code was already in effect in most
situations as a result of sporadic legislation and deposit agreements or
legends on deposit slips, most of which had also been adopted and used
in Wisconsin prior to its adoption of the Code. Hence the Code's solu-
tion will not be new. The concepts can be called the "settle now investi-
gate later" ideas. When a bundle of checks are presented to a payor bank
either by mail or through a clearing house, or deposited by a customer,14
the credit, given immediately for the full amount thereof, is called "pro-
visional," and the bank is afforded additional time in which to locate
and return the few "not good" items or to revoke the credit if any item
forwarded to another bank is returned unpaid. The same concept applies
between banks. The forwarding bank receives a "provisional" credit or
remittance at once, and the bank receiving the bundle of checks may
revoke, at a later time, that minor portion of the total credit which may
be required to cover the small number of "not good" items.
The time selected for the completion of the necessary processing is
called, in the Code, the "midnight deadline." This, by definition, means
midnight of the next banking day following the later of (a) the banking
day on which the bank receives the item or (b) the banking day from
which the time for taking action commences to run.' 5 Thus, if items are
received, at 10:30 a.m. in the morning clearing house exchanges, the
bank will have the balance of the day and all of its next banking day
in which to sort and post the items.
Prior to the adoption of the so-called deferred posting statutes, items
12 See, e.g., Wendkos v. Scranton Life Insurance Co., 340 Pa. 550, 17 A. 2d
895 (1941) ; Seager v. Dauphinee, 284 Mass. 96, 187 N.E. 94 (1933); Gordon
v. Levine, 194 Mass. 418, 80 N.E. 505 (1907); Lloyd v. Osborne, 92 Wis. 93,
65 N.W. 859 (1896).
' aSee, e.g., Wisner v. First National Bank of Gallitzen, 220 Pa. 21, 68 At. 955(1908); Notes 63 A.L.R. 1138 (1929), 68 A.L.R. 862 (1930).
14Bulk handling of checks by business firms is not unusual. The author has
seen a single deposit by Sears Roebuck & Co., and by a gas company that
covered the entire top of a fair-sized table. Indeed, to speed the collection
process, banks have arranged with such bulk customers for the application,
by the customer, of all necessary bank endorsements (including a Federal
Reserve Bank stamp) and for sorting in accordance with the collection
routing.
1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-104 (h) defines "midnight deadline." The second
part of the definition, [the b] is made necessary in part by §4-107 permitting
banks to establish a 2:00 p.m. cut-off hour after which items will be deemed
received at the opening of business on the following day.
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received in the morning had to be reconciled, sorted, posted, and "not
good" items sorted for return before the close of business on the day of
receipt. As a practical matter, this meant that "not good" items had to be
ready for a 3:00 p.m. "return clearing." As volume increased, this
meant, for most bank clerks engaged in this work, a lunch hour starting
at 2:30 p.m. or a little before. The turn-over in personnel resulting from
this, plus the cost of increasing staff to handle the work load in a span
of about four to five hours required that more time be allowed.
1
16
Coupled with the "provisional" credit concept, it did not seem too
great a risk to extend for an additional banking day the time allowed
for internal posting and operation. Banks were thus enabled to organize
the work flow on a more rational basis, sorting the items to the indicated
account classifications on the day of receipt, and posting them the fol-
lowing morning. Returns could be proofed, sorted and effected the
second day.
The additional time did not, however, delay the transfer of bank
credit, at least as between collecting and payor banks. Where settlement
is effected in the clearing house situation by mutual debits and credits
to reserve accounts at, say, the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank, this
has been done. The reserved right of charge back is limited to that small
percentage of "not good" items. Where settlement is effected by debits
and credits to mutual accounts, this has been done with the same minor
reservation. Where settlement is effected by means of a remittance draft,
(i.e. a draft on a third bank sent to collecting bank by a payor bank) it
will have been started on its way for collection.
Thus, the extended time has not extended the risk of loss through
bank failure. It must, however, be admitted that this particular risk, in
recent times, is about the least of the risks encountered in the collection
10 Another problem was that until incoming items were sorted, there was little
work for the bookkeepers at the deposit ledgers. Yet in order to cover items
cashed "over-the-counter" etc., the posts had to be manned. Special problems
are also created in the case of large metropolitan banks where the volume
of items has required three shift round-the-clock operations in the "proofing,"
"sorting," and "posting" operations. "Proofing" covers the verification of
totals, checking to see that all items on the tape are in fact included in the
bundles, and reconciling the totals of the sorted items with the totals of the
items to be sorted. Special machines have been devised for the sort and proof
operations. Some run 25 adding machine tapes simultaneously, one for each
of 24 "sorts" and a master proof tape covering the totals. The text has dis-
cussed the "incoming" items from other banks or from a clearing house.
Deposited items, of course, go through a similar process, being sorted first
as between "on us" and other items. The "on us" then join and swell the
incoming stream. The outward items are then sorted to the appropriate cor-
respondent to which they will be forwarded.
Electronic bookkeeping has added one other process for the first bank
using such equipment, and that is the "encoding" whereby the amount of the
check is typed on the item in magnetic ink "readable" by the various machines.
Proper arrangements have been made with practically all check printers so
that the numbers indicating the bank of deposit and the customer's account
are already printed with magnetic ink.
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process. Bank closings have not been significant in number or economic
impact, in recent years.
What has been extended by the deferred posting concept, however,
is the risk against "competing" items, namely the attaching creditor, the
stop order, the bank's own right of set-off, and the insolvency of the
drawer, or his carelessness in overdrawing his account. Here a decision
had to be made on the basis of the conflicting thrusts of differing policies.
To the extent that the risk on non-payment is extended, the equivalency
of payment by check to payment by cash is defeated. This can be readily
understood. Initially the author, and certain banker friends, felt that
it would be possible to have a "day blockage" of items, and have Mon-
day's items take precendence over Tuesday's stop payment orders, at-
tachments and the like.' 7 However, several practical difficulties stand in
the way of such a rule. One is the continuous processing of items on a
three shift basis by the large banks. Another is the problem of the item
paid over the counter. This is a service customers expect and so, too,
do other members of the public. Where an item is presented for pay-
ment over the counter on Tuesday, it is just not practical to hold up the
payment until the state of the customer's account after the posting of
the Monday items can be ascertained. Then, too, the bank's determina-
tion of whether or not to exercise a right of set-off, sometimes depends
upon the nature and amount of the items presented for payment' This,
too, could not be ascertained until Tuesday, when, under the "day-
blockage" rule, it would be too late.
The resolution of these conflicting policy interests was viewed in
the light of the very small percentage, one-eighth of one percent in
dollar amount, of "not good" items, and the added cost to all depositors,
of installing the necessary mechanical operations to ensure that all
banks would be able to ascertain, in the few situations of contest, the
facts on which the determination of various claims to the funds on
deposit would depend.' 9
It is all very well for advocates of "distributive justice" to suggest
that the risk of loss should be borne by the banks as a cost of doing
business. But things do not happen that way.The risk-loss goes into the
cost of doing business, and, in the long run is passed on to the customers
1' The earlier drafts discussed by the author in Deferred Posting and Delayed
Returns-The Current Check Collection Problem, 62 HARv. L. REv. 905, 946 ff(1949), were drafted on this theory, which, at the time, seemed to the author
to have a certain fairness to all parties.
'sParticularly where the bank desires equal repayment with other creditors, or
has restricted repayment of subordinated debt, etc.
-9 It is submitted that Dean Beutel in The Proposed Uniform (?) Commercial
Code Should Not be Adopted, 61 YALE L. J. 334 (1952), overlooks these
practical considerations, and the cardinal fact of the very small area of risk,
when he criticizes the bank collection article as being a sellout to the bankers.
As early as 1954 the author pointed out that the "day blockage" rule appeared
to be impractical. Leary, Bank Deposits and Collections under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 15. U. PiT. L. REv. 565, 574 (1954).
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of the bank in increased service charges, increased interest costs and
the like. Thus, in all such cases, the real issue is whether the risk, or
the cost of installing procedures to avoid the risk, should be borne by
the community or by the person dealing with the issuer of the check
that was found to be "not good."
The foregoing, it is believed, justifies the decision to extend the
time area in which the risk of non-payment operates, as an application
of the principle that the need for a speedy transfer of bank credits
should give way to the need for efficient operations and a subsidiary
principle that the vast majority of good transactions should not be
rendered more expensive and reduced in speed for the benefit of the
relatively few "not good" items.
Against the background of these principles then, let us trace the
progress of a check given in payment for goods or services through the
various sections of the Code applicable thereto, disgressing now and
again to fill in the story with appropriate discussion of the various rules.
To do this we will have to poach, from time to time, on the territory
of those who would explain Article 3, as the rules relating to negotiable
instruments also apply to checks, except as the provisions of Article 4
conflict with or supersede those of Article 3.10
RESPONSIBILITY OF PAYEE TO INSTITUTE COLLECTION
In our supposed case, the check has been issued to the payee. What
rules govern what action he must take? Reference has already been
made to the "same town" and "different town" rules at common law.21
The penalty for delay in starting a check through bank collection chan-
nels was, at common law, the absolute discharge of any indorsers, and
the discharge of the drawer "to the extent of the loss" caused by the
delay.22 One problem in the drawer situation was how such loss could
be proven. Obviously, the drawer only suffered loss to the extent that
he lost a deposit credit at his bank; that is, the area of the loss is the area
of bank insolvency. Often the percentage to be recovered by depositors
was not known, and could not be known until the closed bank was
liquidated. A second problem was that such speed in rushing to one's
bank did not fit into the customs of the people on two scores. In the
large business with monthly bills, the volume of checks received at cer-
tain times precluded a deposit on the day following receipt.23 Many
20 UNIFORM CoM MERCIAL CODE §4-102.
21 Supra p. at note-calls 11 and 12.
22 See UNIFORM NECOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §186. Case law discharged the
indorser absolutely. See e.g. Nuzum v. Sheppard, 87 W. Va. 243, 104 S.E.
587 (1920); Note, 11 A.L.R. 1028 (1921). A similar rule was applied to the
remitter. Commercial Inv. Trust v. Lundgren - Wittensten Co., 173 Minn. 83,
216 N.W. 531 (1927).
23 This is particularly true of utilities, stores, etc. The Code was being drafted
in 1949-1951. Cyclical billing by utilities, department stores, etc. had not been
adopted to any widespread extent. Even where it has, customers still have the
habit of paying once a month, and often at or near the first part of the month,
probably coinciding with the receipt of the monthly and semi-monthly pay
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people in rural areas do not engage in daily banking. Despite the rules,
many people do not immediately bank checks as they are received. As
at common law, it was felt that the drawer should stand behind his
check for a greater time than the indorser.
Consequently, the Code adopts a rule discharging the indorser if
bank collection is not instituted within seven days after the date of the
indorsement, and the drawer thirty days after date of issue whichever
is later.24 This rule applies only to an uncertified check drawn and pay-
able within the United States, and which is not a draft drawn by a bank.
The specified time limits are stated in terms of a "presumed" reasonable
time,25 and are to be considered in the context of the general rule that
presentment, in order to charge secondary parties, must be made within
a reasonable time after such party became liable thereon.26 The Code
eliminates problems of proof of loss in the drawer's situation by pro-
viding for his discharge only if he assigns to the holder the "cover"
maintained at his bank for the check.27 As partial assignments are gen-
erally recognized, this provision should cause no procedural difficulty.
In many cases, however, a drawer will not be able to prove that he was
deprived of any funds by reason of the insolvency of the payor bank.
This is because Federal Deposit Insurance will cover, in full, all de-
posit accounts up to $10,000. While this will cover a substantial majority
of all outstanding deposit accounts, the occasional account with a bal-
ance exceeding $10,000 will present interesting questions. Will the re-
covery from deposit insurance have to be pro-rated with the holder who
delayed instituting bank collection ?2 It would seem so, as the issue
check. To paraphrase "The law does not change habits, and habits change but
slowly with the law."
24 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-503 (2). Indorsements, except bank indorse-
ments, usually are not dated. In the vast majority of cases, however, an in-
dorsee is a business and will bank its checks within 7 days of receipt.
25 "Presumed" is a defined term [UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-201 (31)] and
means, in this context that the trier of fact must find 30 days to be a reason-
able time with respect to the liability of a drawer unless and until evidence
is introduced which would support a finding that 30 days is an unreasonable
time. Such evidence could, the author assumes, be introduced either to shorten
or to lengthen the "presumed" reasonable time.
26 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-503 (1) (e). Section 3-503 (2) of the Uniform
Commercial Code provides that a reasonable time for presentment is deter-
mined by the nature of the instrument, any usage of banking or trade and the
facts of the particular case. Section 1-205 (2) of the Uniform Commercial
Code defines a usage of trade as "any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question."
Thus a general practice of depositing promptly could be shown to reduce
the 30 day period. What will be the effect of attempting to fix a shorter rea-
sonable time by agreement under Sections 4-103 and 1-204 of the Uniform
Commercial Code in view of the specific tests for determining a reasonable
time? Such an agreement would be one of the facts of the particular case,
and in the author's opinion would be upheld if the time specified were not
manifestly unreasonable.
27 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-502 (1) (b).
28 There is some question as to how the assignment will operate in this situation.
Assume an account of $31,000, and a dividend of 662/3% from the closed
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under the Code is the extent to which the drawer is deprived of funds.
On the other hand, the assignment is only to be of the depositor's rights
against the drawee or payor bank. Since the rights to deposit insurance
arise by reason of the funds maintained on deposit, it does not seem to
be too great a stretch of the interpretive process to believe that the
insurance recovery should also be pro-rated. This result also flows from
the fact that the concept of the assignment was designed to avoid the
difficulties inherent in proving loss to the drawer where his bank was
not yet liquidated. Hence the phrase "rights against the drawee or payor
bank" should include all rights derived from the existence of the de-
posit, including deposit insurance.
RIGHTS ON DEPOSIT OF CHECK
Returning now to the main thread of the collection of a check and
assuming a timely deposit, what rights and duties are then created? As
we have seen, the credit given the depositor, in the absence of "agree-
ment otherwise" is provisional merely, dependent upon the check prov-
ing to be a good item. Two main issues then arise: (1) when can
the depositor utilize his provisional credit in his own business, and
(2) when does the right of the "depositary bank" 29 to revoke the pro-
visional credit expire. This first question divides into two subquestions,
one is when will the depositor's checks not be returned "N.S.F." (not
sufficient funds), and when will the depositor, by legal action, be able
to compel the payor bank to account to him as a debtor.
If the deposit is made in money, then the credit is final when made,
but in order to protect the bank against claims for wrongful dishonor,
etc., the deposit does not become available for withdrawal "as of right"
until "the opening of the bank's next banking day following receipt of the
deposit." 30 Here, perhaps, a digression should be made to flag one possi-
bility. The phrase "next banking day following receipt of the deposit"
should be read as if it said "next banking day following the day of re-
ceipt of the deposit." This rendering is required by Section 4-107 which
provides that banks may fix an afternoon hour of 2:00 P.M. or later as a
cut-off hour fo the handling of "money or items" and may treat receipts
of items or money arriving after such a cut-off hour as having been "re-
ceived at the opening of the next banking day." 3' Thus, if such an hour
has been fixed, and appropriate public notice thereof has been given, or
bank. The depositor, if no delayed check were involved, would receive $24,000,
composed of $110,000 of insurance and $14,000, being a two-thirds recovery
on the remaining $21,000. The holder of the delayed check must, therefore,
obtain by the assignment 24/31sts of the face amount of his check. Or, will
the rule be that the delaying holder is to be limited to the claim against the
uninsured overplus, on the theory that it is the excess over insurance only
that was the "cover" for his unpresented check?
29 Defined as the first bank taking an item for collection. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §4-105 (a).
3 0 
UNIFORM, COMMERCIAL CODE §4-213 (5).3 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-107.
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agreement thereon reached with depositors 3 2 money deposited after 2:00
P.M. on Monday will not be available for withdrawal "as of right" until
the opening of business on Wednesday. This follows from the fact that
it is the deposit slip, not the money itself, that results in the posting of
credit to the depositor's account. Both money and checks are entered
on the same slip, and it must take its place in the flow of papers being
processed.
If the item deposited is a check on the depositary bank, the avail-
ability for withdrawal as of right follows the "deferred posting" rule
that we discussed above,33 and occurs at the opening of the bank's sec-
ond business day following the day of receipt of the item, and is express-
ly made to depend upon the final payment of the item.34 Thus availability
as of right occurs at the opening of the next business day following the
expiration of the "midnight deadline" for processing and sending for re-
turn of not good items. A question might arise under the "additional
day" rule of Section 4-108 which permits a "collecting bank," on its own
authority, to grant an additional day in a good faith effort to secure
payment. A collecting bank is defined as any bank in the collection chain
"except the payor bank."' The definition does not, as does the definition
of a depositary bank, include a bank acting as a collecting bank even
though it is also the payor bank. In view of the dual position of a bank
acting as both depositary and payor bank, both depositor and drawee
being customers, it would seem that the power to extend for an addi-
tional day should not be automatically extended to the "on us" check.
Yet, in view of the fact that over half of the "not good" items are paid
on a second presentment, the matter should, perhaps, be covered by
agreement between the depositary bank and its depositing customer.
VARIATION OF CODE RULES BY AGREEMENT
A digression here to discuss, briefly, the limits upon agreements
varying the provisions of Article 4 seems appropriate, as it can be done
32 Some commentators have raised a question of how a bank "may fix" a cut-
off hour. See e.g. Clarke, Bailey' and Young, Bank Deposits and Collections,
24-25 (1959). How does a bank fix any rule binding on its depositors? By
public announcement or by legend on its deposit slips or deposit agreements,
as in the past. In this case, the notice should be given in the same manner
as notice is given of the hours the bank's doors will be open-by a posted
sign. Similarly another commentator has raised an issue as to the effect of
Daylight Saving Time unless the particular state has a statute permitting the
use of some other time during the year. Funk, Banks and the Uniform Conz-
vmercial Code, 133 (1962). Such a restrictive interpretation, it seems to the
author, does not give due consideration to the "commercial" purposes of the
Code. The purpose of the "cut-off hour" is to close off the time earlier than
the usual hour for closing the bank's doors. Consequently the "commercial"
time generally used in the community on the particular day is what was
intended. If a bank usually opens its doors at 9:00 A.M., when Daylight
Saving Time is effective, the doors usually open at 9:00 Daylight Saving
Time, not at 10:00 A.M. Daylight Time.
33 Supra p.
34 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-213 (4) (b).
3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-105 (d).
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to some extent in the light of the proposed agreement just mentioned.
Here we find some degree of parallelism and some degree of difference
between the general provisions of Section 1-102 (3) applicable to the
Uniform Commercial Code as a whole and Section 1-103 (1) which
is limited to Article 4.
The general section provides, to paraphrase, that, unless otherwise
specifically stipulated in the Act, the provisions of the Code may be
varied by agreement,
except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agree-
ment, but the parties may, by agreement, determine the standards
by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured
if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
The specific section in Article 4 states that all provisions of that Article
may be varied by agreement
except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for
its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or
can limit the measure of damages for such lack of failure; but
the parties may, by agreement, determine the standards by which
such responsibility is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.
Thus on comparison, it would seem that in the area of bank collections,
the bank may contract out of duties of diligence and reasonableness to
the extent that such duties are not comprehended in the concept of
"ordinary care."
One trouble to be faced in drafting any bank collection agreements
will be found in the verbal formulation of the Code's rules governing
the actions required of banks in the collection process. Under Section
4-202 the entire Article is apparently framed in the context of a duty
of ordinary care.36 Absent a specific regulation of a specific situation in
some subsequent section of the Article, all common law rules of the
particular jurisdiction, which were also framed in a verbal formulation
of "ordinary care" can be deemed incorporated in the Code. To the
extent that specific sections and time limitations are set forth in other
sections of Article 4, they could be interpreted as being formulations of
particular manifestations of ordinary care designed to change the effect
of certain prior common law decisions, leaving all else unchanged.
The author attempted, unsuccessfully, to induce the banking and
legal fraternities to adopt some other formulation in place of "ordinary
care" to avoid the problem and to have bank collections law as it relates
to checks considered as it really should be, a unique status where all
36 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-202 (1) provides "A collecting bank must use
ordinary care in. . . ." There then follow subdivisions (a) through (e) which
cover the gamut of the collection process from sending for presentment, send-
ing notice of dishonor or non payment, returning the item, settling for the
item, protesting if necessary, and giving notice of loss or delay in transit.
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rules must be geared to the needs of a low cost, bulk handling operation
for the benefit of the community as a whole. It is to be hoped that courts
interpreting the law will consider the real factual situation, and not
transfer to the interstices of the Code a mortar of outmoded concepts
and rules relating to a simpler day when negotiable instruments were
presented over the counter for cash by an agent working only for one
prinoipal and handling one item. In interpreting the ban against con-
tracting out of the duty of "ordinary care" the courts should, the author
believes, limit "ordinary care" to a meaning of good and accepted bank-
ing practice; or the care ordinarily used in the situation by a banker.
This interpretation is practically required by the provisions of Section
1-102 of the Code in any event.3 1
It seems clear that a collecting bank may, by agreement with its
customer, extend its time for taking action . 3 And, under the "chain of
command" theory, all "intermediary banks" will be protected if acting
in accordance with the instructions of the immediate transferor.3 9
With respect to payor banks, different considerations come into play.
On the policy side, the drawer of the check is the customer of the payor
bank, and it would have a tendency, possibly, to favor its customer. It
is true that in many instances the forwarding bank is also a customer,
but action with respect to an occasional check would probably not disrupt
that relationship. Where the payor bank is also the depositary bank, it
37 This Section provides that the Code shall be liberally construed to promote
its underlying purposes and policies one of which specifically set forth in
Section 1-102 (2) (b) is to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties. An interpreta-
tion of "ordinary case" which would prohibit any departure from the specific
sections of Article 4 would not be a construction promoting the underlying
purposes and policies of the Code. Compare the refusal of the N.Y. Court
of Appeals to impose on a collecting bank any duty not to collect its own debt
so long as no bad faith was involved. Hydro Carbon Processing Corp. v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 16 N.Y. (2d) 147, (1965).
38 At least to to time limits the way seems open to almost any agreement since
Section 4-202 (2), immediately following the duty of "ordinary care" in
taking all indicated types of action, provides that a collecting bank acts "sea-
sonably" if it acts by its "midnight deadline" following receipt of the item.
Hence it follows that the Code equates "ordinary care" with "seasonably"
when the issue is one of the time of taking action. See UNIFORM COMMIERCIAL
CODE §4-202 Comment 3. "Seasonably" is a defined term [UNIFORM COi-
MERCIAL CODE §1-204 (3)] meaning acting "at or within the time agreed, or
if no time is agreed, at or within a reasonable time." The bank does, how-
ever, have the burden of establishing that a reasonably longer time than its
midnight deadline is "seasonable." Where there is an agreed time, this last
provision can only mean that the bank has the burden of establishing the
agreement, and, probably, that its terms are not manifestly unreasonable. See
Section 1-204 (3). Where the bank has no agreement, then under the guide-
lines of depending upon "the nature, purposes and circumstances of the ac-
tion," the bank would be subject to the risk of non persuasion of the trier
of fact [UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-201 (8) definition of burden of estab-
lishing] that its time of acting was reasonable.
39 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-203. A collecting bank [which term includes
all intermediary banks, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-105 (c)] is not liable
to prior parties for any action taken pursuant to instructions or in accordance
with any agreement with its transferor.
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would have conflicting loyalties. On the technical side, while time
limits for a collecting bank are stated in terms of "seasonable" action,
including, therefore, by definition, agreement upon time limits, the time
limits applicable to a payor bank are not so stated. The applicable Code
sections merely use the term "midnight deadline. '40 On the other hand,
the term "ordinary care" is not specifically applied by the Code to the
duties of a payor bank.
The conclusion, therefore, must be that the time limits applicable
to a payor bank may be varied by an appropriate agreement. The policy
considerations outlined above precluded any extension to the payor bank
of the unilateral freedom to extend time limits, but an agreement by
the customer satisfies the policy. There are, in most instances, however,
almost insuperable practical difficulties which limit the ability of a payor
bank to obtain an effective agreement, including the problem of con-
sensually binding remote parties.41
Returning from the digression to the case at hand, an agreement
with its depositor that the depositary bank (whether or not also a payor
bank) may, in a good faith effort to obtain payment from its customer,
extend time limits, seems not in conflict with the Code. The depositing
customer may or may not be able to bind prior endorsers. If this is a
risk, he can take it voluntarily. The bank taking such action would not
appear to be assuming any liability to a party with whom it has no con-
tract, and the agreement would protect its right against its customer.
As to rights of recourse against others, it too would voluntarily take the
risk, if any.42 The extension being an extension of the time in which to
pay, dishonor will not occur until the end of the extended time.43 If
40 Part 3 of Article 4 covers the collection duties of a payor bank, and has but
three Sections, none of which use the term "ordinary care."
42 See Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle with Complexity, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 265 at
278 ff. On the other hand, some help may be found in Section 4-103 (2) pro-
viding that "Federal Reserve regulations, and operating letters, clearing
house rules, and the like" are effective as agreements, even if specific
assent is not obtained. Such agreements are still subject to the limitation
that a bank may not relieve itself by contract from its obligation of "honesty"
(UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-203) and "ordinary care." Agreements may
fix "standards" for determining "ordinary care" if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.
42 Notice of dishonor is necessary to charge an indorser [UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §3-501 (2) (a)]. It is due from a bank by its midnight deadline and
from any other person before midnight of the third business day "after
dishonor or receipt of notice of dishonor." [UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§3-508 (2)] Presumably the time runs from dishonor only against a person
in whose hands the instrument is dishonored, and as to all others the time
runs from receipt of notice of dishonor. A point to watch is that notice of
dishonor may be oral, given in any reasonable manner. [UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §3-508 (3)]. It must however be given by or on behalf of the holder
or a party to the instrument who can be compelled to pay it, or a party who
has himself received notice. [UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-508 (1)].
43 This follows from the definition of dishonor in Section 3-507 (1) that an in-
strument is dishonored when a necessary or optional presentment is duly
made "and payment cannot be obtained within the prescribed time." A change
in time of payment could be effected by contract. Such a contract would not
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the dishonor should be held to have occurred by the midnight deadline,
a prompt giving of notice of dishonor by the bank's customer will pre-
serve his rights of recourse in any event.44
Having discussed the "on us" item where the depositary bank is also
the payor bank, the situation of the check drawn on another bank re-
mains to be considered. Here the depositor's credit availability depends
upon receipt of a final settlement by the depositary bank and the lapse
of "a reasonable time to learn that the settlement is final." 45 Actually,
in banking practice, the depositary bank does not, in the absence of
special instructions, learn that a settlement is final. What happens is
that the depositary bank learns that an item is not paid when the item
is returned to it. It never, or almost never, gets advice of a payment.
In practice no particular restrictions are placed upon the drawings of
most customers. Only a few accounts are set up so as to prevent the
drawing against uncollected funds, and as to these accounts, there are
so-called "availability schedules" that are followed.4 6 How are the
availability schedules constructed?
Each check, today, carries a fraction somewhere, usually in the upper
right hand portion. The numerator consists of digits to the right and
left of a dash. The left hand digits indicate the city or state in which
the bank is located, and the right hand figures indicate the particular
bank. For example, 1-8 indicates The First National City Bank of New
York, and 3-3 indicates Philadelphia's Girard Trust Bank.47 Denomina-
tors are of two sorts, three digit and four digit numbers. The first digit
of a three digit denominator, and the first two of the four digit indicate
the Federal Reserve district in which the drawee bank is located, the next
to the last digit indicates the Federal Reserve Bank or branch which is
closest, for collection purposes, to the drawee bank, and the final digit
gives the number of days after arrival at the indicated Federal Reserve
contain a prohibited "disclaimer" of an obligation of diligence, etc. prohibited
by Section 1-102 (3). Indeed since a check is a demand item, and needs only
to be presented within a reasonable time after date or issue, an advance
agreement to extend the payor bank's time for payment, in effect would make
the initial delivery only a notice that presentment is to be considered as
made in a timely manner so that the time to pay expires at the end of the
extended time. A secondary prior party could not claim any right to an
earlier presentment.
44 His time to give notice of dishonor expires on the third business day after
he himself receives notice of dishonor.
45 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-213 (4) (a).
46 When electronic computers are used, the availability schedules can be pro-
grammed into the machines, and drawing against uncollected funds more
rigidly controlled.
47 Under the National Numerical System of the American Bankers Association,
the numbers 1 to 49 were assigned to cities ranked according to financial
importance at the time, and numbers from 50 to 999 were assigned to states
and territories.
The fractional numbers here discussed should be distinguished from the
numbers at the bottom of the check, usually near the left, which are used in
electronic check processing and are discussed infra at p.
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Bank or branch required for the availability of credit in that institution.
For example, 212 indicates a payor bank in the second reserve district
closest to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York City, with credit avail-
able two days after the check reaches New York City. 310 means a bank
in the Cityof Philadelphia with credit on the day of arrival at the Federal
Reserve Bank in that Third District. Knowing how long it will take
for its "cash letter" 48 to reach the "Fed" in New York, the depositary
bank can compute when in normal course it will receive the check re-
turned unpaid, if that should be the fate of the check. From this informa-
tion it can fix the time when its depositor will be permitted to draw
against his provisional or tentative deposit credit with a minimum of
risk. As stated above, the rule of the Code is phrased in terms of
reasonable time for learning of final payment, and the time, of course,
varies depending on the location of the drawee or payor bank.
What happens if the depositor makes withdrawals against uncollected
funds? To start with, the Code makes it very clear that the depositary
bank is its customers' agent, even if funds the withdrawn.49 The deposit-
ing bank has a statutory perfected security interest in all deposited checks
and the proceeds thereof.50 It has a right to charge any unpaid check
back to its customer's account, unless it has received a final settlement
for the item.5 1 The charge-back is automatic, but does not relieve any
bank from liability for its failure to use ordinary care.52 If the payor
bank makes a late return, a charge-back by the depositary bank will not
discharge it of its accountability for the check, in the author's opinion.
The Code itself has no express provision on the precise point.
In addition, as a collecting bank, the depositary bank has received
from its customer certain statutory warranties.53 These cover his title
or authority to obtain payment, the genuineness of all signatures, ab-
sence of material alteration, the fact that no party to the check has a
4sThis is the name given by banks to the form accompanying a bundle of checks
forwarded for collection. It used to list and describe each included check.
It is no longer practical, due to increased volume, to do more than enclose
an adding machine tape showing amounts and total. The cash letter shows
the sending bank, the receiving bank, the date of sending and the total en-
closed.
49 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-201 (1). Whether the bank was a "purchaser"
occasioned much trouble in the past. The Section makes it clear that, even if,
despite a contrary presumption, a "purchase" relationship is found in the
facts, it is a term of the purchase contract that the purchasing bank will
forward the check in accordance with the rules of the Code.
50 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-208. Subsection (4) provides that no security
agreement is necessary, no filing is required, and the interest has priority over
conflicting perfected security interests in the check, but that otherwise the
security interest is subject to the provisions of Article 9.
51 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-212.
52 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-212 (4) provides as follows: -
"(4) The right of chargeback is not affected by:
(a) Prior use of the credit given for the item; or
(b) failure by any bank to exercise ordinary care with respect to
the item but any bank so failing remains liable."
53 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-207.
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defense good as against him, and the fact that he has no knowledge of
any insolvency proceedings against the drawer. In addition, the cus-
tomer, if he has received settlement or other consideration, engages that
upon dishonor and upon the giving of any necessary notice of dishonor
and protest, he will, as the Code phrases it, "take up the item." Then the
next subsection, while calling this engagement an engagement to honor
the item, provides that damages for a breach of the engagement to honor
shall not exceed the consideration received by the customer "plus finance
charges and expenses related to the item, if any."54 It would seem that
the theory of this provision is to place the bank in the position it would
have been in had it it not handled the item. The Official Comment indi-
cates that the term "expenses" was intended to cover not only collection
expenses, but "in appropriate cases could also include such expenses as
attorney's fees." 55 As an example of finance charges, the situation where
the collecting bank charges interest on its advance during the period
necessary to effect collection is cited by the Comment. This is all very
well in the case of a foreign collection. There is usually no such charge
in the check collection process, and perhaps interest is not recoverable
for the customer's use of the advance during the normal check collection
interval.56
If, however, the recovery for breach.of the collection warranty is
not effected except after protracted litigation over whether the customer
knew, for example, of pending insolvency proceedings, it is the author's
opinion that interest will be recoverable on the amount of the damages,
but that the interest will run from the date the customer should have
responded to the claim, even though no interest was charged on the
amount of the depositary bank's advance during the period of collection.
In a recent case the Georgia Court of Appeals had occasion to apply
these principles where a depositor had withdrawn the credit given for a
deposited check of $49,600 which was returned unpaid four days after
the deposit because the drawer had stopped payment. The bank sued the
drawer, not its depositor, claiming holder in due course status, and
recovered. 5
7
As in most of the cases under the Code the result was what one
would expect from reading the Code. For present purposes the case is
54 In this the bank collection warranties differ from the general negotiable in-
strument warranties of Article 3 where no measure of damages is specified
and the engagement is to pay the instrument. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
Code §§3-417 and 3-414.
55 See Official Comment 5 to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-207.56 Where the customer draws against uncollected funds he is borrowing from
the bank against the "float." Interest is usually not charged on a de tilnimis
basis as compared to the entire operation of the bank. Such a charge could,
of course, be provided for in the deposit contract. It is another story if the
amount is outstanding during litigation, especially if the customer has moved
his account to another bank.
57 Pazol v. Citizens Bank of Sandy Springs, 138 S.E. (2d) 442 (Ga. Ct. App. Div.
No. 1, 1964).
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interesting for the number of arguments that the drawer raised and
on which he lost.
His first contention was that Article 4 made the depositary bank the
agent of the depositing payee, and therefore its rights could rise no
higher than those of its principal. While admitting that Section 4-201
created an agency status, the Court quite correctly pointed out that the
purpose of the section was to make it clear that credits given a depositor
were provisional and that risk of loss remained upon the depositor. Even
though an agent, the depositary bank also became a holder of the check.
As to the plaintiff bank's status as a holder, the allegation was that
the payee delivered the check to the bank and "caused the same to be
endorsed for deposit." The court ruled that even if the plaintiff bank
itself had put the "for deposit" indorsement on the check, it was still
a holder. Article 3's definition of an indorsement requires that it be
written "by or on behalf of a holder,"58 and Section 4-205 (1), (one of
the innovations of the Code) authorizes a depositary bank to supply an
indorsement of the customer which is necessary to title "unless the
item contains the words 'payee's indorsement required' or the like."5 9
As the item did not cofitain such a term, the indorsement was an author-
ized indorsement of the payee, constituting the bank a holder.
Holder in due course status, of course, requires more than being
a mere holder. The additional requirements are (1) value, (2) no
notice that instrument is overdue, (3) no notice of a claim or defense,
and (4) good faith.6 0 The Court pointed out that Section 4-209 spe-
cifically provides that for purposes of determining its holder in due
course status, "a bank has given value to the extent that it has a security
interest in an item." Turning to Section 4-208 (1) the Court found that
it specifically provided that the bank is given a security interest in
deposited items to the extent that credit given for an item has been
withdrawn or applied. 61
58 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-302 (2).
59The drawer sought to limit the effect of Section 4-205 by reference to the
Official Comments where the purpose of the Section was stated to be "to
speed up collections by eliminating any necessity to return to a non-bank
depositor any items he may have failed to indorse." (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §4-205, Comment 1). The Court summarily rejected the argument that
the section was thus limited to items deposited in something other than a
bank. Both the Official Comment and the Court overlooked the definition of
a "customer" [UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-104 (1) (e)] which specifically
includes a bank maintaining a deposit account with another. Normally a
second bank would not be a depositary bank (i.e. first bank in the collection
process). But if checks were issued or indorsed to it, not for collection, but
in payment of interest due on loans, various fees and charges, etc., then the
first bank to which it sent the items would be the depositary bank (as to
those items) and authorized to supply its customer's (the first bank's) in-
dorsement. The Comment cannot limit the text, and should be read as re-
ferring to the usual situation of one who forgets to indorse, the depositor who
is not a bank.
60 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-302 (1).
61 To round out the discussion of the bank's security interest in the "float,"
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Our Georgia case is useful in that one further point was raised.
The deposit was made on January 9, 1964. The petition alleged that
the check was dated January 4, 1964, but the copy of the check attached
to the petition showed that it was dated January 4, 1963. On demurrer,
the drawer urged that this showed the bank was on notice that the
check was overdue when deposited. The Court said the allegation as
to dating would permit the introduction of parol evidence to show the
true date.62 Under the Code, a more apt allegation in this case would
have been that the check was issued on January 4, 1964. The Code, with
respect to notice of overdue status of a check, counts time from "its
issue," not its date, and uses a 30-day presumption. 63
COLLECTION RULES BETWEEN BANKS
Having covered, to some extent, the relations between the depositor
and his depositary bank, the next phase in the course of a check's prog-
ress to presentment and final payment, will relate to transactions between
banks occurring in the process of forwarding and presentment.
Certain mechanical rules may, perhaps, be noted at the outset. Sec-
tion 201 (2), in effect, locks a check in banking channels, once it has
been indorsed, "with the words 'pay any bank' or the like." Only a
bank may thereafter acquire the rights of a holder until the check is
returned to the depositor initiating collection, or until it has been
specially indorsed by a bank to a non-bank. The avowed purpose is to
protect the ownership rights of the customer initiating collection if the
item is subsequently acquired improperly by a person not a bank, so
attention is also directed to Section 4-208 (2) providing that where credit
is given for several items deposited at one time and is withdrawn or applied
in part, the security interest remains on all of the items. Thus, as in the
present case, the bank could sue the drawer of any one or more of the items.
The last sentence of the subsection adopts the "First-in-first-out" method
of determining which credits are withdrawn. This follows the holding in
First National Bank v. Court, 183 Wis. 203, 197 N.W. 798 (1924) where,
although the opinion seems to go on a theory that the collecting bank "owned"
the items, really gave the bank no more than a security interest, as does the
Code.
62 Pointing out that, under Section 3-114 (3) the dating of an instrument is
only presumed to be correct and citing Mutual Fertilizer Co. v. Henderson,
18 Ga. App. 495 (1), 89 S.E. 602 ( ) ; and Wiggins v. First Mutual Build-
ing & Loan Assn., 179 Ga. 618, 176 S.E. 636 ( ).
63 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-304 (3) (C). The retention of "time after
issue" from N.I.L. §53 may seem unfortunate with respect to subsequent
takers of a post dated check. But the holder is denied holder in due course
status by the Section only if he has "reason to know" [not a defined term
but used in the definition of "notice" UNIFORM COMMERCIL. CODE §1-201(25)]. The author has pointed out elsewhere that "reason to know" smacks
of an objective standard. See "Commercial Paper" Uniform Commercial
Code Handbook (A.B.A., 1964) p. 110, et seq. For purposes of time for
presentment, the Code, in Section 4-503 (2) (a) uses "date or issue, which-
ever is later" in the context of a 30 day presumption. The difference appears
to be intentional. One who deals with a check which he has "reason to know"
was post-dated may well lose the right to take free of defenses at an earlier
date than that at which the drawer could claim a partial discharge by reason
of a late presentment, especially when, by dating his check ahead, the drawer
has prevented earlier presentment.
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the Official Comment states." It is submitted that in connection with
Section 4-206 (eliminating any requirement of indorsement for trans-
fers between banks) the purpose is to avoid problems of whether an
indorsement is "special" or "in blank," if the check should be picked up
by a non-bank holder. Consequently, the phrase "and the like" should
not be narrowly construed to cover only the tired, old rubber stamp type
of indorsement, "Pay any bank, banker or trust company," but should
cover any situation of an indicated transfer to a bank by special indorse-
ment naming a particular bank, or by any language indicating a pur-
pose to transfer to a bank.65 Since a collection system cannot depend
on whether a proper indorsement has been made by a customer, who
sometimes doesn't indorse at all, the depositary bank must indorse with
the words "Pay any bank," in all probability.
As just indicated, Section 4-206 provides that any agreed method
which identifies the transferor bank is sufficient for the further transfer
to another bank. This immediately raises the issue of identifying an
item "for what purpose." If the identification is solely for the purpose
of securing credit for the package of checks forwarded for collection,
the "cash letter" would of itself do all the identifying needed in the
case of checks, and there would be no need for any bank to stamp any-
thing on the back of a check.
But, as the discussion of the Georgia case has indicated, it may be
important for a bank in the chain of collection to qualify as a holder in
due course. Banks are not apt to change present operating methods
unless assured that, as to negotiable items in the collection process, each
bank can, with respect to any value given by it, qualify as a holder in
due course, even though the occasions when this is important may be
relatively infrequent.
Section 4-209 covering when a bank gives value for the purpose
of holding in due course specifically requires the bank otherwise to
comply with the requirements of Section 3-302 on what constitutes a
holder in due course. One of these requirements is that the bank be a
"holder." This is a defined term in Article 1, and requires that the check
be "issued or indorsed to him, or to his order, or to bearer, or in blank.
' 66
Section 4-206 is, perhaps, lacking in complete effectiveness in that by
64 Such indorsements are classified as restrictive. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§3-205 and 3-206. Discussion of the effect of the Code on restrictive in-
dorsements is beyond the scope of this Article, except to state that such in-
dorsements, except by an immediately prior party, have no effect on inter-
mediary banks or payor banks. They can conclusively assume that the de-
positary bank has performed its duty of applying value consistently with
the indorsement.
35 As a practical matter, the words "For deposit" might be construed as suf-
ficient. Most state banking laws define the banking business as that of re-
ceiving money on deposit, and thus the words should sufficiently indicate a
purpose to transfer to a bank.
66 UNIORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-201(20).
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virtue of the section, the agreed method, only makes the receiving bank
a "transferee," and Article 3 makes a great distinction between a "trans-
fer" and a "negotiation,"6 7 the latter also requiring that the transferee
become a holder. For banks to operate with the greatest freedom under
Section 4-206, it will be necessary for the depositary bank either to take
under a blank indorsement, or itself indorse the checks "in blank."
What then is an indorsement "in blank"? By definition it is one
which specifies no particular indorsee and may consist of a mere
signature," 68 but it must be written by or on behalf of the holder and
on the instrument or a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a
part thereof." 69 While "signature" is not a defined term, "signed" is,
and governs, in the author's opinion, what constitutes a signature.
"Signed" means "any symbol executed or adopted by a party with
present intention to authenticate a writing."70 Hence the stamping of
the back of the check with a bank's bank transit number under a reso-
lution of the bank's board of directors that this is the depositary bank's
signature should suffice to make all other banks "holders" when they
take a check so stamped. Notice could be given to other banks through
clearing house rules of Federal Reserve operating letters or corre-
spondent bank letters.
Need any other bank also stamp the check? Certainly not for quali-
fying itself as a holder, nor as indicated hereinafter, is such action
necessary for creating rights or imposing liabilities. Does this dispose
of the matter? Unfortunately not. There is still the 32 of 1% of the
items that must be "returned" unpaid. Under customary procedures
of giving a "provisional" settlement or credit for checks received for
collection, a bank expects to be able to revoke the credit or obtain re-
fund from the forwarding bank with which it dealt, and, presumably,
with whose credit for the occasional refund, it is satisfied. At the
moment, therefore, each bank handling an item in the chain of col-
lection must identify itself on the item.
Anyone who has examined a welter of bank stamped indorsements
on the back of his returned checks knows the almost impossible problem
facing the "return-item" teller in a collection department. The Code will
eliminate, when adopted in all U.S. jurisdictions, the need for all the
wording about "all prior indorsements guaranteed, etc." If proofing
and sorting machines can sufficiently vary the location where the transit
number will be stamped, so that each bank does not superimpose its
number over all the others, a great gain will have been made.
6
7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§3-301 and 3-302.
68UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-204(2). Cf. UNIrORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§3-401 (1) which states "No person shall be liable on an instrument unless
his signature appears thereon."6 9 UNIFOR!I COMMERCIAL CODE §3-302(2).
70 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-201(39).
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DIRECT RETURNS
The Code, in optional Section 4-212(2), which has been omitted in
the Wisconsin enactment,7 has opened the way to another solution.
This is the practice of "direct returns." Under this practice, instead of
returning any unpaid item to its forwarding bank, the returning bank,
be it payor bank, or presenting bank, or an intermediary bank, encloses
the return item in an envelope of approximately the same size, fills
out a draft on the depositary bank on the form already printed on the
envelope for the amount of the unpaid item and sends it off in its next
cash letter. Provisional credits or settlements given by prior banks stand,
and a new set come into existence, firming up when the depositary bank
pays the envelope draft and charges the amount back to its customer.
Simple?
Except for the one risk of insolvency of the depositary bank, this
system should work perfectly. The "envelope draft" will reach the de-
positary bank at the same time, or sooner than the normal return item,
so that the depositary bank is in the same position vis-a-vis its customer
as it would have been had the tentative credit been revoked by the in-
termediary bank to which it sent the item. Under direct returns, how-
ever, the self-help of a revocation of the provisional settlement would
not be available. In good times, and as to most depositary banks, this
presents no problem.72 It must be noted that the Code Section is only
an optional one, and need not be used except where the bank making the
"direct return" is satisfied that it is not taking any risk.73 Another debit
entry in the "direct return" ledger is that the amount of the returned
item remains in the "float," and until settled for finally, the returning
bank does not receive the amount thereof in actually and finally collected
71 Cf. WIs. STATS. §404.212. A number of other jurisdictions have also omitted
the Section.
72 This might be an area for "agreement otherwise" among banks even in states
where the optional subsection has been omitted. The bank using the "direct
returns" system, in the absence of such an agreement, would be doing no
more than making a call upon a prior indorser to take up the item pursuant
to the contract made upon its indorsement, or calling upon a prior warrantor
under Section 4-207. The limitation of damages in Section 4-207(3), last
sentence, would not, in the case of "cash items," limit the recovery of the
"direct-returning" bank since it will have received a provisional settlement
for the face amount of the check. The bank making the direct return will
have "firmed up" its provisional settlement, and, by virtue of the "zinger"
Section 4-213(3) discussed infra. p. 00, all prior credits will be final. Should
the depositary bank refuse or be unable to pay the envelope draft, each bank
handling the item could agree to remain liable and take over the claim
against the depositary bank, as if the item had been returned through it.
There is still a risk element as the first intermediary bank would not receive
notice until several days later than otherwise it would. The "Agreement"
could suspend the use of direct returns in time of financial stress.
73The effect of this 1/ of 1% on bank earnings should be balanced in part
against the savings in handling costs occasioned by not having to check out
and find the proper return channel.
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funds. Under the present method, final funds are received almost forth-
with upon a return.7 4
The exact language of the Code appears to contemplate a direct
mailing of the return item to the depositary bank and a separate mailing
of a collection draft. This is an unworkable and improper interpretation,
not giving full consideration to the qui facit per alium facit per se prin-
ciple. The contrast is between a return as a direct collection and a return
that must seek out and follow its particular forwarding channel. If a
small country bank takes all its incoming items from a particular inter-
mediary bank, return items sent back to that bank should under the
system of "direct returns" follow the same channels as presentment
of an item drawn on that bank.
Should the practice become universal, there would be no need for
any but the depositary bank to "indorse" items. In passing, it should be
noted that our British cousins have, ever since 1957, also abolished the
requirement for indorsements, on their "cheques," 75 and, as far as the
writer is informed, without any particular ensuing difficulties.
RULES FOR FORWARDING AND PRESENTING
The discussion has already covered the sending of checks through
banking channels for collection and the return of the item if unpaid.
In each instance the assumption has been that the item was forwarded
in a "cash letter" to a bank in which the forwarding bank had an ac-
count, and that provisional settlement was effected by credit to the ac-
count. This is certainly the usual method to a point. The discussion now
must turn to the rules governing methods of forwarding, presenting
and settling, still against the factual pattern of collecting checks.
The basic job of the collecting bank is to cause the item to be pre-
sented promptly. On the other hand, due to the volume of items, some
concessions had to be made to the practicalities of bulk handling and
to'the availability of mail transport. A bank west of Milwaukee receiv-
ing the deposit of a check payable by a San Francisco bank may, due
to airmail schedules, effect a faster collection by routing the check
through Chicago where fast, direct nonstop jet airmail service is avail-
able than by sending the check westward by railroad mail. A small
suburban bank may save considerably on costs by sending all deposited
checks to its central city correspondent, even though some are drawn
on a bank in an adjoining suburb or a bank to which faster presentment
could be made by use of another correspondent. Thus the Code, on the
problem of "routing" could do no more than set forth guide lines and
considerations. The sending must be by a "reasonably prompt method"
75 CHEQius Acr, 1957; Cf. 204 H.L. Deb. (5th Ser.) 667-692; Negrah, Cheques
Act, 1957, 78 J. INST. BANKERS 254 (1957).
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taking into consideration the depositors special instructions,7 6 the num-
ber of checks on hand, the cost involved in alternative methods, and the
usual practices of the depositary and similarly located banks.77 Obvi-
ously, deliberate "circuitous routing" is still a violation of the basic
duty of "ordinary care" in sending for presentment.7 8 The multitude of
possible situations, however, made unworkable any attempt at greater
specificity.
Presentment by mailing directly to the payor bank is specifically
permitted. 79 This follows much prior statutory law needed to overcome
the common law and N.I.L. concept that presentment had to be made by
someone other than the person to pay, and that the presenter only re-
leased the instrument aganist receipt of legal tender.80 Thus "cash
letters", if the volume and state of reciprocal accounts makes it econ-
omical to do so, may be sent directly to the payor bank. Often, of
course, presentment is effected through a clearing house,8 ' and even
more recently presentment is effected by delivery to so-called "off-
premises" centralized bookkeeping centers.82 Under earlier drafts of
the Code this latter practice occasioned some disquietude for some cau-
tious bank lawyers. 83 The addition of a special subsection in the 1962
76 Generally an item forwarded with "special instructions" becomes a "non-cash"
item, and the collection process differs somewhat, including far more "indi-
vidual" handling, than a check. Certain particular instructions such as "protest
waived" or "wire fate" do not have this effect everywhere.
77 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-204(1).
7s Prior case law would, therefore, be still applicable except as changed by the
general guide lines mentioned in Section 4-204(1).
79 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-201(2) (a).
80 This was reiterated in Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U.S. 160 (1924),
as the rule applicable in the absence of agreement, or proof of a custom or
usage of trade existing in such a manner as to be binding on the customer.
Cf. Slone v. First National Bank, 260 S.W. 948 (1924). Prior to the Code,
statutes existed changing the common law rule of Malloy and allied cases
in some 36 American jurisdictions. On this score (mail presentment) the
provisions of Article 4 may be nore restrictive than Article 3 which permits
presentment by mail to any payor, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-504(2) (a).
It is not clear, however, that Article 3 permits an "agent to present" to mail
the instrument to the payor. Article 3 treats any demand upon the payor
for payment, no matter where made, as a presentment, and then lists re-
quirements which the payor may make "without dishonor." One of these is
exhibition of the instrument from which it could be inferred that in the
mail presentment referred to in Article 3 the presenter retains the instru-
ment and, if an agent, should not surrender it. On such an interpretation,
Article 4 enlarges upon what is permitted under Article 3.
5l Article 4 makes no mention of presentment through a clearing house. It is
specifically covered by Section 3-504(2) (b). To the extent that the "item" in
Article 4 covers broader territory than "instrument" as used in Article 3, the
validity of a clearing house presentment lies in "agreement" found from clear-
ing house rules under Section 4-103(2).
82These may often be at another bank. The cost of the electronic processing
machines is so great that some banks, to keep their machines fully occupied,
and to reduce unit costs of operation, have undertaken the check posting for
others. In some areas groups of banks have pooled resources to pay for
electronic machines.
83 The arguments are presented in Clarke, Electronic Brains for Banks, 17 Bus.
LAw, 532, at 539 (1962) ; Funk, Presentment under The Uniform Commercial
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Official Edition of the Code has eliminated this quaere. The new sub-
section provides that presentment may be made by a presenting bank
at any place where the payor bank has requested it to be made." This
subsection, taken in connection with Article 3's new concept of present-
ment as any demand for payment anywhere,85 should put at rest any
question as to the validity of a presentment made by delivery to an
electronic processing center, provided that the delivery properly identi-
fies, to those in charge of the facility, the proper payor bank to be
charged with the items.
Two further sections also are most clearly made necessary by the
bulk processing of checks. One is that which provides that no bank
except a depositary bank, including one which is also the payor bank,
is in any way affected by the restrictive indorsement of any person
other than its immediate transferor.8 6 The other adopts, for all practical
purposes, the "chain of command" theory of bank collections, namely
that only a bank's immediate transferor can give it instructions, or put
it on notice with respect to an item handled for collection. 7 Quite apart
from the utter impossibility of any one bank's identifying a particular
check, should it receive a notice or order from the "depositor-owner"
of the item, the bank would have no way of knowing whether or not a
prior intermediary or even the depositary bank had made advances and
so acquired an interest in the check described in the notice. These rules
are practical applications of the principle that the speedy movement of
the vast majority of good items must not be clogged or made more ex-
pensive by procedures designed to afford undue protection for the
owners of the small number of not-good items.
As had become the law, or was thought to be the rule by contract
or custom almost everywhere, long prior to the drafting of the Code,
no bank is liable for the act or omission of a correspondent selected
with due care.8 8 Earlier unapproved drafts had contained provisions
Code-A Reply to Mr. Clarke, id at 548. See also The Law of Presentnent
of Checks for Payment, 78 BANKING L.J. 663-666 (1961); Leary, Comnier-
cial Paper, in Uniform Commercial Code Handbook (1964) 87 at p. 122-125.
84UNIFORTM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-204(3).
85 UNIFOR%! COMMERCIAL CODE §3-504(1). The trouble arises from the preamble
to subsection (2) of this Section which reads "Presentment may be made,"
and then lists three specifics. If interpreted as an exclusive listing, then pre-
sentment anywhere else is not valid. Prior drafts more clearly indicate the
original draftsman's intent. After defining presentment as any demand for
payment, Dean Prosser's subsection (2) had as its preamble "Presentment
may also be made." This, to the author, more clearly indicated the more
exclusive nature of the listings. In the final drafting, the permissible "may"
perhaps is overworked in using it to convey the idea of a non-exclusive
listing, except as considered in the light of this full argument made by
Funk, et al, note 79, supra.
86 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-205(2).
87 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-203.
88 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-202(3).
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designed to reinstate the so-called New York rule on the theory that the
present regulation of banks had so minimized the risk of bank failure,
that such liability might not be unduly opposed in view of other provi-
sions of the Code. The sponsoring organizations, however, felt other-
wise, and such a provision did not receive final approval. The very
consideration urged for the adoption of such a rule, the diminished risk
of bank failure, also indicated that there was no substantial risk to the
depositor-owner of the item in continuing the Massachusetts rule of
non liability for correspondent's action. The only debit is that of incon-
venience of forum. 9 Again, the principle of not increasing the cost for
the handling of a great bulk of good items by spreading a cost of litiga-
tion in a foreign forum over all items indicates that this cost, infinitesti-
mal though it may be, be borne by the owner of the item that was mis-
handled, rather than that it be a cost of the banking system as a whole.
PROCESS OF PAYMENT
So far the course of a check through the depositary bank and up to
its presentment to the payor bank has been traced in rough outline.
There remain to be considered the processes of payment and the means
of getting the drawer's final credit transferred to final credit in the
account of the depositor.
The prior discussion has been based upon the common practice of
forwarding a cash letter to an intermediary or payor bank with which the
forwarding bank has an account. The process in each such instance is
exactly the same as that by the holder-depositor and his* bank, i.e. a
tentative credit is given subject to pro tanto revocation or charge-back
of the amount of the "not good" items in the cash letter.
The credit in an account is only one method whereby banks settle
for items. The term "settle," as used in the Code, covers, by definition,
delivery of cash, a clearing house settlement, credit in an account of the
presenting bank maintained with the payor, an authorization to charge
an account of the settling bank held by the presenting bank, delivery
of a check on a third bank for collection, or in any other manner per-
mitted by instructions.9" This definition of "settle" is narrower, and
covers less than the list of what a collecting bank may (but not must)
take in settlement of a cash letter. Yet there is a reason for the seeming
difference which permits a collecting bank to take a cashier's check or
similar primary obligation of a remitting bank, but only if the remitting
bank is a member of or clears through a member of the same clearing
house or group as the collecting bank.91 The initial reaction to this by
many people is that it is wrong to permit a payor bank, for example, to
substitute its promise to pay for an actual transfer of funds, and, so it
89 This, of course, only applies in the case of the interstate collection item.
9 0 UNIFORM, COMMERCIAL CODE §4-104(1) (j).9 1 UNORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-211(1) (b.)
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would be if the Section were that broadly worded. The limitation to
membership in the same clearing house, or group clearing arrangement
is the saving grace. Actually, where there is a clearing house or a group
clearing arrangement, settlement for checks will usually be made
through the clearings. But suppose for some reason, perhaps special
instructions, a check or special group is presented over the counter out
of ordinary channels. The payor bank gives its cashier's check to the
messenger who takes it back to his bank. Suppose further that taking a
primary obligation of the payor bank was held to be lack of ordinary
care. The presenting bank is now faced with a dilemma if it refuses
the cashier's check and sends back for the items so as to treat them as
dishonored, it will probably take until the next day to send out notices
of dishonor. In any event, a return of the cashier's checks may result
in the tender of a check on a third bank which will have to be collected
or else refused on the ground that the prior action constituted dis-
honor. 92 On the other hand, if the cashier's check is promptly sent
through the clearing, the transfer of bank credits will have been effected
almost as promptly as if the cashier's check had, been returned. If the
collecting or presenting bank and the payor bank use the same daily
clearing arrangements, this will be especially true where the initial pre-
sentment was by mail, and the cashiers' check was returned by mail.
Stress must also be placed upon the permissive nature of the preamble
of the subsection authorizing this procedure. Obviously, if a payor bank
regularly and continuously uses such a practice, or uses it for the first
time in a period of cash stringency known to the collecting bank, a
blind acceptance of the cashiers' checks, in extreme cases, may raise
questions as to whether such acceptance constituted the exercise of
"ordinary care."' 93
The discussion has covered the concept of a "provisional" settle-
ment made pending determination of whether all of the presented
checks are properly payable. How is it determined whether a settlement
is or is not provisional? Here the general clue is found, as it was at
common-law, in the concept of "final payment". Provisional settlements
for checks become firm pro tanto upon final payment of each item in
92 Section 3-506(2) provides that payment may be "deferred" without dishonor
pending reasonable examination to determine whether it is properly payable.
By giving its own obligation for the item, the payor bank has made this
determination, unless, of course, it reserved a right of charge-back or other-
wise.
93 Section 4-103(3) provides that "Action or non-action approved by this Article
or pursuant to Federal Reserve regulations or operating letters constitutes
the exercise of ordinary care . . ." The permissive nature of the listing in
Section 4-211 (1), however, may permit a court to rule, in strong cases, that
the discretion granted should have been negatively exercised. However, the
permissive blessing in the great majority of situations (absent "bad faith")
should be construed as a sufficient approval to grant -immunity to a charge
of lack of ordinary care.
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the group of presented checks. Where a settlement is made for an item,
this constitutes a "final payment" unless the settling bank reserves the
right to revoke the settlement and has the right to make such reservation
under statute, clearing house rule or agreement.94 Consequently, banks
desiring to make provisional settlements should be sure that their forms
contain the necessary reservation of a right to revoke and that authority
to do so exists. The statutory authority, under the Code, in the usual
check collection case is found in the section on deferred posting.95 The
section is limited to demand items other than documentary drafts. The
requirement is an "authorized settlement" before midnight of the day
of receipt. In such case a revocation before final payment and before
the midnight deadline is authorized. It is the "before final payment"
cut-off that must be watched, because unless the right to revoke the
settlement is reserved, the settlement itself constitutes final payment.
The circuity here is more apparent than real. Settlement constitutes
final payment. When it is intended that a settlement be provisional, i.e.,
subject to later revocation, that intent must be manifested by a reserva-
tion of the right to revoke, for example by agreement among banks,
by statements in remittance letters or the like.
Final payment also occurs when a check is paid over the counter,9 6
but this is the relatively rare case compared with the vast multitude of
checks handled otherwise. Final payment also occurs when, having
made a provisional settlement, the payor bank fails to revoke the settle-
ment in the time and manner permitted by statute, clearing house rule
or agreement.
9
7
The remaining step constituting final payment is when the payor
bank completes the process of posting the check to the indicated account
of the drawer.9
The Code uses the verbal formula of "final payment" found in the
common-law cases, but unlike the welter of conflicting decisions at com-
mon law,99 selects, in the main, specific points of time at which final
payment occurs. Some writers have allocated the common-law cases to
94UNIFORM CO aRCIAL CODE §4-213(1) (b). The dual requirement of (1), a
reservation of the right, and (2) authority to make the reservation was in-
tentional, as otherwise the provisions of Section 3-506(2) could be readily
avoided by unilateral action of the payor bank. Settlement will be "final
payment" if, despite authority to revoke, no right to do so is reserved.95 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-301 (1).9 6 UNIFORI COM MERCIAL CODE §4-213(1) (a).
97UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-213(1) (d).
98 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-213 (1) (c).
99 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-213, Comment 2 referring to cases fixing
the time of payment in remittances as
(1) when the remittance draft is accepted by the presenting bank;
(2) when the remittance draft was finally paid; or(3) at the election of the collecting bank under Section 11 of the Bank
Collection Code recommended by the American Banker's Association if
actual and finally collected funds are not received.
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one of three rules, one called the "intention to pay" rule, a second
called the "posting to the account" rule, and the third called the "recap-
ture" rule. 00 Even if so classified, the cases within each rule selected
different points of time at which either the intention to pay was mani-
fested or the power to recapture was lost. An extreme case under the
power to recapture rule arose in the Supreme Court of Minnesota where
the ruling was, apparently, that a check was not "paid' until the payor
bank settling by remittance draft, could no longer recapture the remit-
tance draft from the mails.101 The bank having made no effort to recap-
ture, the ruling was that it had dishonored a timely stop order. Thus,
where the issue is the accountability of the payor bank for the proceeds
of the item, the Minnseota case is not, in a strict sense, a precedent.
In a modern check situation, the principal area of vagueness under
the Code will center around the phrase "completed the process of post-
ing." A fairly recent addition to the Code is Section 4-109 which de-
fines the "process of posting."'" As can be seen from a reading of the
text, the "process of posting" is a combination of two diverse elements.
One is the element of judgment in determining whether or not to pay,
and the other is the mechanical element of recording the debit of the
amount of the item on the customer's account. The judgment portion
of the "process of posting" includes verification of signatures, inspec-
tion of the check for obvious alterations and any other relevant action
based on judgment.
The recording element, in today's mechanics, using computers and
electronic processing, often precedes the judgment element. Normally
100 See, e.g. Huggins and Phemister, Bank Deposits and Collections, Uniform
Commercial Code Handbook, 129 at 138 (1964) dividing the cases into the
"intention" and "recapture" theories. Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle With
Complexity, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 263 (1952), advocated the "posting" theory.
101 Bohling v. First National Bank, 233 Minn. 523, 48 N.W. (2d) 445 (1951).
10 The Section was added in the 1962 Official Text. While it may not have
been intended to make any substantive change, in the meaning of "completing
the process of posting," as pointed out infra, the wording may have done
so. The section reads
"The 'process of posting' means the usual procedure followed by a
payor bank in determining to pay an item and in recording the pay-
ment including one or more of the following steps as determined by
the bank:(a) verification of any signature;
(b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available;(c) affixing a paid or other stamp;
(d) entering a charge or other entry to a customer's account;(e) correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action with
respect to the item." (Emphasis supplied)
The problem arises from the placement of the word "erroneous" only in
front of "action." Thus the reversal of any entry, even for reasons other
than that it was made in error, constitutes a part of the process of posting.
In Gibbs v. Gerberich, v Ohio App. (2d) 93, 203 N.E. (2d) 851 (1964), the
court recognized the dual nature of the process of posting and held that final
payment had not occurred since the judgment element had not been exercised
prior to the service of the restraining order.
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in the payor bank, the process of posting involves three parts. The first
is called "encoding", and this involves seeing to it that the drawer's
account number and the amount of the item are imprinted on the check
in the proper magnetic ink. In the case of most payor banks today, the
account number is already printed in magnetic ink when the check
book is printed for the customer. If the check has been forwarded from
or through a fairly large correspondent bank, the amount of the check
will already be encoded. Generally banks know which of their corres-
pondents will have "encoded" and which will not and can route incom-
ing cash letters accordingly. As a part of the encoding process, in at
least one large Eastern bank, the "on us" items are sorted between
"regular" checking accounts and the "special" checking accounts, and
they are fed into the computers on different "runs."
After "encoding", the batches of checks are placed into the elec-
tronic machines where they are read, posted and sorted at simply incred-
ible speeds. 103 The sorted checks, now broken down by account numbers,
are then delivered to the signature control clerks for verification and
checking. It is here that the judgment element of the determination to
pay or not to pay will be made.
For purposes of when secondary parties are discharged and the
liability of the payor bank on its provisional settlements becomes irre-
vocable, the cut-off time might be fixed at this final point. But human
error, and sometimes even machine error, can creep in. And so one of
the included steps in the process of posting includes the correction of
errors and the reversal of entries.10 4 It would seem to follow, then, that
the subdivision of Section 4-213 (1) based on "completion of the process
of posting" would not be satisfied, until the time within which entries
could be reversed had expired. So long as time remains in which entries
could be reversed, it would, in view of the enumeration of "reversal of
entries" as one of the steps included in the "process of posting", be
difficult for a court to say that the "process of posting" had been com-
pleted. Normally, in the non-clearings-cash-letter-for-credit-in-an-ac-
count situation this means that the process of posting is not completed
until the expiration of the midnight deadline where the bank is work-
ing three shifts in its processing of checks, otherwise at the close of
operations next preceding the midnight deadline.
Once "final payment" has occurred, the payor bank becomes "ac-
103 See note 8 supra.
104 Example 3 given in the Official Comment to the Section, relates only to an
entry made on a forged signature, and then adds "or that the item should
not be paid for some other reason," which might include anything. The
thrust of the Comment, however, is that a determination to pay or not to
pay once made completes the process of posting. This may not necessarily
be so, as the signature clerk's decision may be changed by higher authority.
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countable" for the item. 0 5 A case decided under the Code has correctly
equated the word "accountable", as used in this context, with the phrase
"liable for the amount of the item."'0 8° Also, in the usual cash letter
situation, once the item has been finally paid, the accountability will be
instantaneously released, under the provisions of the "zinger" section
which provides that when provisional credit given by the payor bank
becomes firm-"zing"-all prior provisional credits are instantaneously
made firm.10 7 In some situations, however, final payment will have been
'made, and the payor bank will remain "accountable" for the amount of
the item for an appreciable period of time. An example, rare though
it may be today in the case of checks, is where a payor bank has re-
mitted to the collecting bank making a mail presentment, by the payor
bank's draft on a third bank, and final payment by the payor bank occurs
prior to the final payment on the remittance draft. But during this pe-
riod, secondary parties on the check have been discharged by final pay-
ment. By virtue of Section 3-802(1) (b) the discharge also covers, unless
otherwise agreed, liability upon the obligation underlying the instru-
ment.1os
What then, has been substituted for the discharged liability? In the
case of payors which are national banks, quite frankly, only the liability
of the payor bank, buttressed as it is by Federal Deposit Insurance
treating the owner-depositor of the check as a depositor in the payor
bank.10 9 In the case of state chartered banks, the owner-depositor has a
preferred claim.110 Again, in a situation probably only binding on state
chartered banks, a suspension of payments by a payor bank which has
not made a final settlement for an item does not prevent certain provi-
sional settlements from becoming final, and presumably from firming-
up all prior provisional settlements in the chain of title."'
EFFECT OF STOPS AND LEGAL PROCESS
At this point another digression is in order. The concept of payment
was used at common law to govern the results in several situations, and
considerations applicable to one situation led to results that were not
applicable to other situations. The concept of "payment" was used to
105 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-109(e).
106 Rock Island Auction Sales, Inc. v. Empire Packing Co., Inc. et aL (Illinois
National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, Appellee) Ill. Ct.
App. Docket No. 38745--Agenda 19-November 1964.
107 UNIFORi COMMERCIAL CODE §4-213 (2).
108 The Section provides ". . . discharge of the underlying obligor on the in-
strument also discharges him on the obligation." While Section 3-603 speaks
only in terms of the discharge of a party by "his" payment, obviously
payment by or on behalf of a drawer discharges indorsers in that their
engagement that such payment will be made has been fulfilled.109 12 C.F.R. Ch. III §330.1.
110 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-214(21.
III UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-214(3), but see the discussion of this sub-
section, infra.
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govern the shift of rights from drawer to payor bank, and from payor
bank to the holder owner. The concept of "payment" was also used at
common law to rule the issue of the priority of competing claims to be
the balance in drawer's account.112 These competing claims, sometimes
called for four "legals," arise from the receipt by the payor bank of
(1) notices or knowledge, as for example of death or an adjudication
of incompetence of the drawer, (2) attachments, injunctions or other
legal process affecting the account, (3) stop orders of the drawer and
(4) a prior right of set-off of the payor bank itself.
If the law were to be the result of a symmetrical series of syllo-
gisms, then obviously "payment" would always occur at the same point
in the collection process, regardless of the issue involved. A proper
answer, perhaps, lies somewhere between the extreme "functional"
approach which would select different points of time for each issue,
including each of the legals, and the extreme "conceptual" approach
which would have a single point fixed to determine payment in all cases.
Operating simplicity and convenience dictates some departure from ex-
treme functionalism in this area. The Code adopts one rule for the case
of final payment when the issues are those arising in the collection proc-
ess, and this is the rule we have been discussing heretofore. It adopts a
somewhat different rule, at least in certain respects, for determining the
point in time when the claim of the depositor-owner of the item takes
precedence over the four legals. This we now proceed to discuss.
Originally in the drafting of the Code, it was felt that the extended
time granted for deferred posting should not operate to extend the
depositor-owner's risk of being defeated by one of the four legals. Con-
sequently early drafts of the Article provided that when the check had
been presented to the payor bank, all legals thereafter arriving at the
bank came too late to defeat the check. The stop-order, attachment, or
other of the legals is such an unusual item and is usually first received
by a responsible employee, so that the time of service or receipt is noted
thereon, or can be reconstructed with substantial accuracy. In some
banks this can be done with checks, as the "batch numbers" of the
proofing department are used in sequence. From the proof department's
batch number, the time of the initial step in the process can be deter-
mined. As to stop-payments the Texas legislature also adopted the time
of presentment as the time at which a stop-payment order came too
late." 3 Many banks, however, felt that the time of receipt or of pre-
112 Possibly one touchstone in the confusing welter of "payment" cases would
be to analyze them in accordance with whether the issue is liability of the
payor bank or a question of priority over a competing claim.
"3See TEX. CiV. STAT. (Vernon 1948)Art. 342-712 as amended by Acts 1957,
55th Leg. ch. 434. Art. 342-704 uses the time of presentment as the point
of time for determining whether the drawee bank was authorized or obligated
to pay the item. An exception is made for a time item in favor of the due
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sentment could not be fixed with sufficient accuracy to be determinative.
Obviously, due to the volume of items handled, time stamping each in-
coming check was not practical. The rule of payment was again chosen,
but with two additional elements not considered in determining final
payment.
One such additional element is acceptance or certification. After a
check has been certified, legals directed against the drawer should be
considered as coming too late. The obligation of the payor bank has been
substituted for the drawer's direction to pay, and under banking prac-
tice, the drawer's account has been debited with the amount of the
check and an account covering certified checks outstanding has been
credited. If certification was procured by a holder, all prior parties, in-
cluding the drawer, have been discharged. T4 If certification was pro-
cured by the drawer, he is not discharged, but the bank's primary obli-
gation should not, with one exception, be varied by the risks of the
drawer's fortunes. This exception is the stop-payment order of the
drawer" 5 who is still liable. But the Code does not draw this distinction,
and provides that a stop order comes too late if the bank has certified
the item.
The other additional element listed in the priorities section, Section
4-303(1), is stated alternatively with the "completed the process of
posting" in the same subsection, by adding thereto "or otherwise has
evidenced by examination of such indicated account and by action its
decision to pay the item." 116 It seems to the author that the added lan-
guage may serve two functions. First, it will cover the practice of "sight
posting" whereby a bank indicates that a particular check is to be paid
out of the usual order, places a "hold" on the account for it and then
allows the check to come through in the usual way. But more im-
date. Presumably this means only if the item was received before the due
date.
114 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-411(1). By negative implication the old rule
of liability remaining where the drawer procures certification remains un-
changed. An innovation is found in Section 3-411(3) permitting a payor bank
to certify a check before returning it for proper indorsement. Note that
supplying its customers indorsement may only be done by a depositary bank
(UNIFORM COMMiERCIAL CODE §4-205) and not then in the case of certain
U.S. Government Checks and insurance company drafts containing a term
requiring the payee's indorsement. Cf. the British practice n. 71 supra.
115 Section 4-403 (1) provides that the customer may stop payment of any item
"payable for his account." Where the drawer has procured certification he
is still liable, and perhaps the check so certified is still payable for his ac-
count. Significantly the section does not say payable from his account. Yet
Section 4-303(1) covers stop orders and requires that they be received prior
to certification. As pointed out, infra, this may leave it to the discretion of
a bank to honor or not honor a request to stop payment on a check certified
at the drawer's request. This is as it should be since the holder has become
liable on the item of a holder prior to presentment for payment, and should
have a discretionary voice in determining whether to refuse to honor its
certification.
116 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-303(1)(d).
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portantly, the phrase should also eliminate, with respect to the four
legals, the extension of time given, in final payment cases, by the in-
clusion in the definition of the "process of posting" of the concept of
reversal of entries. But even if the process of posting may be said to
remain incomplete until time for reversal of entries has expired, a
bank which has done everything except reverse entries has certainly
indicated by examination of the item and by action its decision to pay,
and thereafter the legals come too late.
The distinction is as it should be. The termination of the owner's
risk of defeat by legals should occur at the moment of the final posting.
That additional time is allowed the payor bank for its own purposes,
and that the drawer's liability is continued a bit longer, should not
give any of the "legals" the right to compel a reversal of entries, if no
such reversal should otherwise occur.
One of the four "legals" is the set-off exercised by the payor bank.
Here; again, then is some justification for terminating the bank's power
to obtain priority for its own debt sooner than the power to correct
oversights such as drawing against uncollected funds is ended. With
both the drawer's power to stop and the bank's power to set-off ended,
the longer time available before final payment may be considered made
in the case of the ending of collection, will be of practical importance
in only two or possibly three instances. These are first in the situation
of an error in the process of posting, either human or mechanical, and
second in the relatively rare case of bank insolvency occurring after
mechanical posting is completed but before the expiration of time for
the reversal of entries.
117
The third instance is a possibility, and that is that the differences
between the section on "final payment" before the payor bank becomes
"accountable for the item,"11 and the time when the notice or stop
comes too late, may give the payor bank a discretionary area in which
to operate. It is axiomatic law that, at least until final payment has
occurred, a payor bank is under no liability to the holder of a check.1 9
The Code specifies the point in time when the bank becomes liable, and
gives no indication of imposing any obligation at an earlier date. Section
4-303(1) speaks in terms of suspending the payor bank's "right or
duty" to pay an item. To whom would such a duty be owed? Absent
117 In the latter case, of course, the owner-depositor of the item has a preferred
claim against state chartered banks. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-214(2).
118UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-213(1). This, of course, depends on the in-
terpretation of "completed the process of posting" in item (c) as compared
with item (d) of Section 4-303(1).
119The whole thrust of the postamble to Section 4-213(1) is that the payor
bank is not liable until after final payment. Its contract is only with the
drawer. In the case of items mailed to it, some cases called the payor bank
an "agent to present itself" but this seems mere semantics.
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some clear indication in the Code, only to its customer, the drawer
of a check. The right to pay is personal to the bank. Hence, if the
theory just advanced is correct, the payor bank may reverse entries
and honor a stop order, or notice of adjudicated insolvency,2' 0 or other
legal without liability to the owner-depositor of the check, provided
it has the acquiescence of its customer, the only one to whom, at this
point in time, a duty to pay is owed.
What about reversing entries to effect a set-off ? Assuming that the
customer drawer does not asquiesce, has he any rights in the situa-
tion? He owes both debts, the one represented by his note at the bank,
and the other which he sought to pay by the check. Both being due,
interest runs on both, presumably at the same rate so that no damages
would ensue on that score. However, under the Code the liability of
a bank wrongfully dishonoring a check through mistake, is limited to
actual damages proved.' 1 Consequential damages are recoverable, if
determined as a fact to have been proximately caused.Y A bank,
therefore, may be taking some risk in taking a set-off in the period
available for a reversal of entries.
INSOLVENCY OF PAYOR BANK
What happens in the event of the insolvency of the payor bank?
At the outset, the Official Comments expressly recognize that in view
of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.2 3 the rules do not apply to national banks.
This express recognition should avoid decisions similar to that of the
Illinois Supreme Court which invalidated the Bank Collection Code
because not applicable to national banks.1 4
Upon the insolvency of the payor bank pursuant to the first subsec-
tion of the applicable Section 4-214, items which have not been finally
paid are to be returned to the presenting bank.? 5 Again, in view of
10 As pointed out supra n. 97, the reversal of an entry, language in the defini-
tion of "process of posting" is not limited to reversal of an entry erroneous
when made.
3
2 1 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-402.2 2 
"Whether any consequential damages are proximately caused by the wrong-
ful dishonor is a question of fact to be determined in each case." UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §4-402 last sentence. Most of the cases are concerned with
arrest and prosecution under bad check laws. See Official Comment No. 5.
-3 294 U.S. 216, 55 S. Ct 394, 79 L. Ed. 869 (1935).
124 See People ex. rel. Barrett v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 362 Ill. 164, 199
N.E. 272 (1935). Under the Code a similar argument has been rejected in
Illinois. Rock Island Auction Sales, Inc. v. Empire Packing Co., Inc. et al
(Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, Appellee)
Ill. Ct. App. Docket No. 38745-Agenda 19 November 1964.
25 Actually the section uses the term "suspends payments" defined to include
any official takeover or failure to make payments in ordinary course. UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-104(h). Section 4-108 on delays caused by events
over which the bank has no control, includes suspension of payments, so
that items may be returned even beyond the midnight deadline. Quaere,
however, if the "reversal of entries" phrase in the definition of process
of posting would be coupled with excused delays to extend the time for
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the inclusion of reversal of entries in the definition of "process of
posting," this will require the return of all items as to which the time
for returns has not expired. Thus, if the bank suspends payments on
Tuesday at the close of business, all items received on Monday, on
Tuesday and thereafter, must be returned unless, as to Monday's items,
the clearing house rules, or other applicable agreements, stipulate an
earlier time by which returns must be made than the midnight dead-
line, and such earlier time has expired. In the case of checks, pro-
visional settlement will normally have been made for these items, and
the closed bank will receive a refund or recredit in respect thereof.2 6
A further subsection provides that if a payor bank has given a
provisional settlement and thereafter suspends payments, the suspen-
sion does not prevent or interfere with the settlement becoming final,
"if such finality occurs automatically upon the lapse of certain time or
the happening of certain events .... 112 The language certainly seems,
at first blush, to be inconsistent with the duty to return items not
"finally paid." All provisional settlements by a payor bank become
final if, after making such a settlement, the payor bank does nothing.
That the subsection apparently was not intended to have this meaning
is indicated by the cross-reference items in the statutory text immedi-
ately following the quoted language. The references are to Sections
4-211(3), 4-213(1)(d); 4-213(2) and 4-213(3). These sections, how-
ever, all refer to situations in which final payment of an item has oc-
curred, and relate to subsequent firming up of provisional credits.
Thus, where a payor bank suspends payments at or after final pay-
ment, such suspension does not interfere with the automatic firming
up of the provisional credits in the chain of collection. 128 If the suspen-
sion occurs before final payment i.e., before the time for reversal of
entries has expired, the items are to be returned unpaid.
The Code does establish a preference for the depositor-owner of
an item in two situations, neither of which will occur with any fre-
quency in the collection of checks. The first is where the payer bank
makes final payment, and then suspends payments without making a
settlement that is or becomes final. We can suppose that the payor
bank has settled for a cash letter by mailing to the presenting bank
on the day it receives its cash letter a draft on a third bank. The draft
is received by the presenting bank on the next day and is forwarded
by it for collection the following day. The payor bank makes final
making returns to revoke a provisional settlement. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §4-213(1) (d), which is governed by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§4-214(3). Hence in the case supposed in the text, there would have to be
prompt action before the midnight deadline to revoke the settlement.
126 Assuming, of course, that a timely return has been made.
1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-214(3).
12SBy virtue of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-213(2).
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payment by its midnight deadline, but obviously before its remittance
draft is presented, and then suspends payments, on the day the remit-
tance draft is presented. The third bank dishonors the remittance draft,
and so the settlement has not become final. The owner-depositor has
the accountability of the payor bank under the postamble to Section
4-213(1), and a preferred claim therefor under Section 4-214(2). A
similar preference is given wh re a collecting bank receives a final
settlement and suspends payments before its settlement with its cus-
tomer becomes final.1
2 9
CONCLUSION
Some seven sections of Part 4 of Article 4 cover some aspects of
the relationship of the payor bank and its customer with respect to
checks. Detailed discussion of these must be reserved for another
time.130 One, however, deserves brief mention. Where a payer bank
pays a check contrary to a valid stop-order, or otherwise under cir-
cumstances giving a basis for objection by the drawer, the bank is
given a statutory right of subrogation to the rights of the person paid
against the drawer, and of the drawer against the payee or holder with
respect to the transaction out of which the item arose.' 31 The right is
limited to the amount necessary to prevent loss to the bank, and the
obvious justification is the prevention of unjust enrichment at the ex-
pense of the payor bank who may be deemed to have paid out its own
funds.
Limitations of space and the patience of the reader have precluded
this discussion from being more than a cursory examination of the
provisions of Article 4 relating to the collection of checks. Changes in
prior law, or at least in what was thought to be the prior law have not
been fundamental. The principal benefit to the law from this codifica-
tion, aside from the clarifications made in areas where precedent was
muddy, will probably lie in the use of the Official Comments to bring
to the decision making process, the business background and the re-
lation of the fact situation to the general business pattern in a way
not heretofore generally done except in cases involving substantial
129 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-214(4).
130 These sections deal with when the bank may charge its customer's account
(UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-402); liability for wrongful dishonor (UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-402); the customer's right to stop payment
(UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-403); no obligation to pay a check more
than six months old (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-404) ; effect of death
or incompetence of a customer, including the privilege to pay checks drawn
before death for ten days after the date of death (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §4-405) and the customer's duty to examine returned items and prompt-
ly report any irregularities (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4406).
131UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §4-407. The Section was drafted to reject de-
cisions such as Chase National Bank v. Battat, 297 N.Y. 185, 78 N.E. 2d
465 (1948); Hunsberger v. Bank of Schwenksville, 38 Pa. D. & C. 323 (C.P.
Mont. 1940).
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amounts of money. In addition, the Code states clear principles in
areas where the decisional law was far from clear and uniform. Natu-
rally the Code is not perfect,1 2 but the net result is a great step for-
ward toward the realization of the objectives of flexibility, modern
growth and uniformity in the many fields of commercial law covered
by the Code, including the law relating to the collection of checks.
132Gilmore, Book Review (Coogan, et aL., Secured Transactions under the
Commercial Code) 73 YALE L. J. 1303 at 1305 (1964), points out the need
for careful and thorough consideration of the Code and the development of
some thoughtful and carefully developed amendatory process.
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